Most countries in Oceania have adequate quarantine legislation, systems and staff to prevent the introduction of new animal diseases. Surveillance and preparedness for dealing with incursions of such diseases are less developed, except in those countries with larger livestock populations. The degree of preparedness for animal health emergencies in the different countries of the region reflects the relative economic importance of exotic diseases to each particular country. For those countries with significant populations of farm animals, appreciable efforts and money are expended. However, in the smaller island countries, it can be assumed that the likelihood of an exotic disease incursion is low and the impact on the economy would be comparatively small. For these reasons, it would be unreasonable to expect these countries to commit significant resources to develop programmes equivalent to those in New Zealand and Australia, for example. Nevertheless, there is a need for increased co-operation between countries in the region. An assessment of each country to determine what resources are available and how they may be used in various aspects of an animal disease emergency, including co-ordinated information sharing, would enable smaller island countries to be fully prepared in the case of an emergency.
Introduction
The occurrence of an exotic animal disease, a new emerging disease or an unusual manifestation of an endemic disease has many impacts. For instance, losses to producers may occur at the local and sometimes national level. Communities that provide services to producers would also be affected, including the consumers who would pay higher prices for foodstuffs. Industry may be affected by loss of export markets (and sometimes domestic markets if consumers perceive a health issue), and the entire economy also may be affected if the export trade impact is sufficiently severe.
Management of animal health emergencies in Oceania
With the aim of developing an overview of the regional capability to prevent or respond to incursion of disease, a questionnaire was prepared and sent to senior government officers in charge of the animal health services in twenty-two countries in Oceania. In addition to information gathered from eight replies to the questionnaire (Australia, Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Kiribati, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Pitcairn Island and Vanuatu), information was gathered from Office International des Epizooties (OIE) publications (3, 4) .
Oceania is the name used for the area extending from Australia in the west, to the Polynesian Islands in the east, from New Zealand in the south and to, but not including, the Hawaiian Islands in the north. The countries and territories in the region are given in Figure 1 .
The countries of this region are unusual in that all are islands or collections of islands, with Australia being an island continent. Papua New Guinea is the only country in the region with a land border (between Papua New Guinea and Irian Jaya, a province of Indonesia). The populations of people and animals in the Pacific Island countries are small and there is comparatively little movement of people and live animals through air and sea ports. These factors may have enhanced the ability to maintain the countries of Oceania free from serious exotic diseases. Statistics of the animal populations for most countries are available (3) but have not been reproduced here. Data for the principal farm animal species for the eight countries that responded to the questionnaire are given in Table I .
Animal populations in Oceania
Australia has a large population of indigenous animals and birds that are of minor importance in the epidemiology of diseases of livestock. Introduced feral animals of potential significance include camels, foxes, rabbits, pigs and donkeys. In New Zealand, there are feral pigs, horses, goats, deer, thar, chamois, possums, rabbits, wallabies and mustelids (e.g. stouts, ferrets), all introduced since Europeans visited or settled in the country. Mongoose are present in large numbers in Fiji.
Other countries which responded to the questionnaire variously reported the presence of the following feral animal species: cattle, pigs, goats, rats, mice, cats, dogs and deer (reported from New Caledonia only).
Veterinary and related resources
The eight respondents to the questionnaire provided information on veterinary resources, as shown in Table II . Auxiliary veterinary staff numbers (4) are given in Table III . If livestock units are assumed as being six for cattle and one for sheep, goats or pigs, it becomes apparent that other responding countries have a more favourable ratio of veterinarians to livestock numbers than Australia and New Zealand, although total resources in those countries are low.
As indicated by the Regional Animal Health Service of the SPC there are very few veterinarians in many other countries in the region (Table IV) , which probably reflects the lack of importance of livestock in the economy of these countries. This could also explain the low priority assigned to contingency planning to deal with animal health emergencies. 
Pigs

Goats
Perceived risks
Perceived risks from rabies, foot and mouth disease and classical swine fever (hog cholera) range from those associated with proximity to Asia (Palau is close to Indonesia and the Philippines) to frequent visits by fishing boats from Taipei China and the Republic of Korea and the population movements in the region (e.g. migratory workers in Nauru, Palau and Guam). Migratory birds are perceived as the major risk of introduction of Newcastle disease and avian influenza. Another more actual risk would be the introduction of ticks such as Boophilus spp. which, if established, could cause an increase in the costs of production in livestock industries. Authorities consider that other threats to many countries in the region include babesiosis, anaplasmosis and ephemeral fever, American foulbrood, European foulbrood and chalkbrood. While some or all of these diseases could be managed in a developed country, the consequences would be more significant in a country with no veterinary service and no funds or resources available to respond and eradicate the disease.
Provisions for the management of animal health emergencies in Oceania
With respect to general principles of effective management of animal health emergencies in the Oceania region, responses received to the questionnaire may be summarised as follows:
Animal disease emergency management-common measures
This area addresses the availability of measures that are common to preventing and dealing with the introduction of any contagious disease. A basic prerequisite is that there is appropriate legislation to prevent introduction of diseases (e.g. border control, quarantine). It is also important that there is a legally enforceable surveillance system (e.g. notification) in place to enable early detection of the presence of an exotic disease and effective powers and trained personnel to deal with any incursions should they occur (e.g. isolation of infected animals and places, destruction/safe disposal, vaccination or treatment of infected and in-contact animals, disinfection of premises, movement control of animals, animal products and fomites).
With the exception of Kiribati which has adopted but has not yet enacted documented protocols, all respondent countries have legislative provisions for quarantine control of animals and animal products at border entry points. All countries have trained staff to implement border control quarantine policies. Apart from Pitcairn Island, all countries also have specific legislative powers to deal with important diseases should they be introduced.
The administration and implementation of legislative provisions for quarantine and control of introduced diseases is centralised in most countries of the region. In Australia, international border quarantine is controlled by Commonwealth legislation. Each State has its own disease control legislation although there has been considerable co-ordination between the States to ensure that legislation is compatible with national plans for responding to emergency diseases.
Funding to control animal disease emergencies is available in all responding countries except the Cook Islands and French Polynesia. Most countries also have provision to compensate owners for animals destroyed in a disease emergency.
Funding for management of animal disease emergencies may be inadequate or not available in many other countries in the region which have fewer economic resources, as funds are likely to be allocated for events that are more likely to happen (e.g. cyclones).
The Regional Animal Health Service of the Secretariat of the SPC, based in Fiji, provides advice and assistance to all member countries on all aspects of quarantine (e.g. quarantine regulations, risk assessment) and animal health (e.g. surveys, contingency planning, public health, clinical veterinary services, animal health information). This agency also initiates, develops and co-ordinates projects of importance to the region in the areas of animal health, animal production, food hygiene and public health.
A comprehensive approach
The comprehensive approach ensures that management of animal disease emergencies includes systems of prevention, preparedness, response and recovery. Import, border and quarantine procedures are the means of preventing introduction of diseases to a country and are based on assessment of risks to animal or public health. Preparedness involves the formulation of plans for responding to an exotic disease, including the technical policies and procedures to be followed, definition of roles and responsibilities of various people and organisations and financial provisions. Response entails the timely implementation of prepared plans by trained personnel able to apply appropriate legislative authority. Recovery usually involves financial provision and provision of support services for livestock owners adversely affected by the control procedures.
Prevention
While many countries in Oceania have small animal populations and limited economic resources, all countries recognise the importance of quarantine and barrier control, and effective measures are maintained within the resources available.
All of the responding countries, except Kiribati, have quarantine legislation that permits control of importation of animals, food of animal origin and many other goods that could introduce diseases. New Zealand and Australia have a well-developed system of import health standards. These standards are based on formal risk analyses. Vanuatu has modelled import protocols on New Zealand or Australian import standards. Kiribati uses the OIE HandiStatus database for initial assessments and consults with the SPC veterinary office in Fiji.
Australia and New Zealand have committed significant resources to monitoring people entering the country through air and sea ports. In addition to the traditional measures, both countries now have X-ray facilities and sniffer dogs to try to detect undeclared goods. These additional measures are not yet available in any other countries in the region, but all countries employ trained staff at ports of entry to detect risk materials. Most Pacific Island countries regard live animals coming through their ports as a low risk. The risk of introduction of disease through animal products is regarded as high in French Polynesia, medium in Kiribati, low in New Caledonia and Vanuatu and negligible in the Cook Islands.
The importation of biologicals and vaccines is controlled in all responding countries. In French Polynesia control is conducted by the Department of Health. In Australia, New Zealand and New Caledonia, import of microbes is restricted to approved laboratories.
Countries with large animal populations (Australia and New Zealand) and those countries with more modest populations (New Caledonia and Vanuatu) have well-developed and documented systems of disease surveillance. Most of the smaller countries (Pitcairn Island is an exception) also have some surveillance capability but it is seldom formally organised, reflecting the small populations of both animals and animal health workers.
Garbage feeding of pigs is permitted and practised in all countries that answered the questionnaire but legislation and official control of this practice is apparendy restricted to New Zealand, Australia and New Caledonia. However, all countries control the disposal of garbage from ships and aircraft.
Preparedness
Preparedness means the existence of arrangements for responding to an incursion of exotic disease. Programmes of preparedness and response to animal disease emergencies have been developed only in countries where farm animals are important to trade (Australia, New Caledonia, New Zealand and Vanuatu).
The capacity to diagnose, quantify and deal with animal disease problems is either limited or non-existent in many countries of the region. Diagnostic laboratories are available only in Australia, New Zealand, New Caledonia and Fiji. Australia has a high-security laboratory capable of diagnosing nearly all exotic diseases (Australian Animal Health Laboratory in Geelong). New Zealand has the capability to diagnose most exotic diseases, apart from vesicular diseases, and has access to the World Reference Laboratory in Pirbright (United Kingdom) for the diagnosis of vesicular diseases.
Laboratory diagnosis of any of OIE List A diseases in many countries in the region will be difficult as some Pacific Island countries are reluctant to allow the transit or loading of samples. However, these countries have formal or informal arrangements to send material for diagnosis of other diseases to laboratories in Australia, Fiji, France, New Zealand or the United Kingdom if the need arises.
Australia, New Caledonia, New Zealand and Vanuatu have documented contingency plans for dealing with exotic diseases that might be introduced. The Australian approach has been comprehensive, including the development of specific strategies for diseases chosen on the basis of an assessment of the probability of their introduction and likely economic consequences. Detailed management and operational arrangements have also been documented. New Zealand has developed a generic approach to the control of exotic diseases, with the rapidity and scale of response varying in accordance with the importance of any particular disease (assessed in terms of rapidity of spread and economic effect).
The smaller countries of the region do not have formal contingency plans. The Secretariat of the SPC held a contingency planning workshop in Fiji in 1991 targeting quarantine officers. The workshop was aimed at the development of a manual on 'How to develop a contingency plan'. However, the main outcome was the recognition that in most of the countries there will be a significant lack of resources from the beginning of a response (P. Saville, personal communication). In most countries there are few staff trained in the recognition of exotic disease. Therefore, the Secretariat is now in the process of developing a modular paraveterinary training programme for the region; part of the module will focus on exotic diseases. At the same time, the FAO has funded the development of an exotic disease manual which is close to publication.
Response
The aim is to provide a timely response to the incursion of an exotic disease. There are well-documented procedures in Australia, New Caledonia, New Zealand and Vanuatu but not in the smaller countries of the region. Staff training and simulation exercises are performed regularly in Australia, New Caledonia, New Zealand and Vanuatu. Audits of systems are also conducted regularly in Australia and New Zealand. An audit mechanism has been developed in Vanuatu but has not yet been implemented.
Recovery
Planning for the recovery period following an animal disease emergency is as important as any other phase of emergency management. Although in many countries compensation would be payable for animals destroyed in an emergency, no country appears to have any scheme for compensating animal owners or other people, for instance in the support or processing industries, who might experience consequential losses because of other actions taken during an emergency, such as movement restrictions. Furthermore, there are no broad scope disaster recovery programmes of the type found in some civil defence planning.
An integrated approach
Many specialist agencies, organisations, producer groups and other bodies can make a valuable contribution to an animal disease emergency response. It is important that all participants understand their roles and responsibilities. These arrangements need to be secured with other organisations that may have to be called upon to provide expertise to help achieve the goal, such as wild animal control authorities.
Countries which have contingency plans also have documented mechanisms for inter-agency co-ordination. In Vanuatu, co-ordination of a number of government departments and private organisations is effected through a National Disaster Management Office. Australia has its 'Comvetplan' that outlines the roles of other departments, e.g. Foreign Affairs and Trade and Defence. Planning in Australia is also linked with the emergency authorities at the State and Commonwealth levels. The organisation responsible in New Zealand (the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry), has memoranda of understanding with other government departments and industry bodies in regard to the involvement of each sector in a disease emergency. The smaller countries do not have such formal systems but co-ordination may probably be easier because of their small size.
Prepared community
Those who will be immediately involved in a disease response (e.g. animal owners and animal health workers) need to be made aware of what is expected of them in reporting suspicious disease, their role and the impact of the incursion. Visitors to a country need to be informed of the risks they may inadvertently pose to quarantine barriers by the importation of animal products. Lastly, there needs to be some level of understanding of the issues among the public.
All countries that responded to the questionnaire are engaged in different types of programmes of community awareness about the introduction of animal diseases. Programmes are directed at animal owners and other animal industry groups in Australia, the Cook Islands, New Zealand and Vanuatu. Kiribati shows videos on exotic diseases to agricultural workers on the outer islands. The general public and school-children in Pitcairn Island are shown material produced by the SPC to inform locals.
An important back-up to barrier control is the targeting of international visitors with brochures, posters and videos on arrival in Australia, the Cook Islands, New Caledonia, New Zealand and Vanuatu.
Conclusion
There is wide variability in the capacity of countries in the region to manage animal disease emergencies. Only countries where livestock is important for trade (Australia, New Caledonia, New Zealand and Vanuatu) have well-developed programmes of prevention and preparedness for animal disease emergencies.
While all countries recognise the importance of quarantine and barrier control and effective measures are maintained within the resources available, many countries of the region have either a limited or non-existent capacity to diagnose, quantify and deal with animal disease problems. For some countries, livestock is important for trade, for other countries livestock is regarded as a source of food or is of significant cultural importance for some ethnic groups. These are all factors which should be taken into consideration in any planning for management of any animal health emergencies within these countries.
Management of animal health emergencies in the region may be enhanced through the sharing of technical advice, thus enabling member countries to develop documented contingency plans at little cost. Each of these countries should be encouraged and assisted in the development of plans designed around national priorities. This may be perceived as being feasible on a country by country basis, but the effectiveness of such an approach would greatly depend on the availability of trained staff.
For many countries and territories in the region, contingency planning requires input of both funds and expertise. Given the small size and limited resources available, a regional co-operative approach to developing and implementing contingency plans for animal disease emergencies may be an attractive option. Animal Health Officers of the Pacific Island Countries and Territories have already proposed that this would be most efficiently organised by a regional body along the lines of a Regional Animal Health Bureau.
To provide effective management of animal disease emergencies in the region, each member country would have to be assessed to determine what resources are available and how they might be used in the various aspects of animal disease emergencies. Such assessment would enable member countries to harmonise, as appropriate, many aspects important for management of animal disease emergencies. These should involve issues relating to legislation, surveillance and laboratory diagnosis, exchange of knowledge and experience, information training, sharing education material and supply of personnel and equipment. This process would provide for the development of strategies aligned with the best interest of member countries while maximising the effective use of their public and private resources. Resumen En la mayoría de los países de Oceania, tanto las normas de cuarentena como los sistemas y el personal mediante los cuales se aplican son los adecuados para prevenir la penetración de nuevas enfermedades animales. Sin embargo, la vigilancia y la preparación para hacer frente a invasiones de tales enfermedades están menos desarrolladas, salvo en los países con mayores poblaciones ganaderas.
El nivel de preparación para emergencias zoosanitarias de los distintos países de la región es reflejo de la importancia relativa que tienen las enfermedades exóticas para la economía de cada país. Los países con poblaciones numerosas de animales de granja despliegan considerables esfuerzos e inversiones. Pero en países insulares más pequeños cabe suponer que la probabilidad de invasión de una enfermedad exótica es baja, y que sus repercusiones económicas serían comparativamente menores. Por tal motivo no es razonable esperar que tales países inviertan cantidades importantes de recursos en la creación de programas equivalentes a los de Nueva Zelanda o Australia, por ejemplo. Aun así, no deja de ser necesaria una mayor cooperación entre los países de la región. Para que los países insulares menores se encuentren plenamente preparados para una posible emergencia es preciso evaluar la situación de cada país y determinar tanto los recursos de los que dispone como la mejor forma de aplicarlos a los diversos aspectos de una emergencia zoosanitaria, incluido el intercambio coordinado de información.
